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Objectives: Infusion safety is a recognised concern internationally. While few observational studies explore the
causes of the errors that occur, even fewer describe how safety is maintained in routine practice. We sought to
understand safety around infusion devices.
Methods: An ethnographic study of infusion device use was conducted on a haematology ward. This included
observations of 51 infusions, plus their preparation where possible, during 120 h of ward observation over
11 days. Field notes were transcribed and analysed using deductive coding informed by distributed cognition. A
further inductive thematic analysis highlighted new themes for making sense of the data.
Results: The distributed cognition analysis highlighted how infusion treatment was aﬀected by interactions
distributed across artefacts, tasks, social networks, physical space and time. These interactions occurred close to
and away from the infusion: at micro, meso and macro levels according to distance from the actual process. The
inductive analysis highlighted three new interdependent themes that account for how safety is constructed and
compromised: structure, agency and performance variability.
Discussion and conclusion: Safety is constructed through the co-evolution of sociotechnical structure and agency
whereby structure shapes and inﬂuences people’s behaviour and people reproduce and create structures.
Everyday performance variability emerges from these interactions, including deviations in processes and out-
comes (e.g. incidents, near misses and opportunities). Studies of everyday safety can explore interactions be-
tween four points of a sociotechnical structuration model: structure, agency, and satisfactory and unsatisfactory
performance.
1. Introduction
Infusion administration has been recognised as a potential safety
risk by regulators, manufacturers and healthcare providers alike (AAMI,
2010; NPSA, 2007; Blandford et al., 2016). Understanding work system
design, which includes the way people, tasks, tools and technology, and
the environment are organised, is essential for insights into safety
(Carayon et al., 2006). Observation is recognised as an appropriate
method for investigating how nurses interact with infusion devices in
practice (Carayon et al., 2005). However, relatively few ethnographic
studies have been conducted on the situated interactions that cause
infusion error and fewer still on how safety is usually maintained.
Taxis and Barber (2003a, b) used a theory of human error to explore
the causes of intravenous infusion medication errors. They observed a
high rate of error across ten diﬀerent wards (including intensive care,
paediatrics, surgery, cardiology and nephrology). The most common
errors were injecting bolus doses too fast and errors in preparing drugs
requiring multiple preparation steps. Error producing conditions in-
cluded the design and use of technology, communication, workload,
patient-related factors and lack of supervision. Furniss et al. (2011b)
investigated ‘unremarkable’ errors and low-level disturbances in infu-
sion pump use on an oncology day care unit. These included nurses self-
correcting their own errors before they reached the patient, which re-
sonates with research that questions what should be classed as an error
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(Baker, 1997), and how one should respond to these low-level dis-
turbances.
Moving away from causes of error, Furniss et al. (2011a) analysed
behaviour that contributes to safety on an oncology day care unit. This
involved nurses anticipating and proactively organising work to reduce
risk. Rajkomar and Blandford (2012) studied infusion pump practice
using distributed cognition on an intensive care unit, without a parti-
cular focus on error. This approach is aligned with a Safety II approach
that advocates understanding how a system ‘normally’ creates safety
and not just how it goes wrong (Hollnagel et al., 2015).
Safety II builds on studies of situated actions in the work place and
seeks to understand the ‘dynamic events’ that create everyday safety
(Haavik et al., 2016). However, advice on how to study performance
variability related to these dynamic events is still maturing (e.g.
Hollnagel et al., 2018). Distributed cognition has a long tradition of
being used for work place studies (e.g. Hutchins, 1995a). It is a cog-
nitive theory that focuses on how information is transformed and pro-
pagated between tools, artefacts and people in sociotechnical systems.
Its central tenets are that cognition should be considered to extend
beyond the brain and that a broader range of mechanisms should be
included when accounting for cognitive activity (Hollan et al., 2000).
Distributed cognition has been used in various studies to understand
sociotechnical systems related to safety (e.g. Hazlehurst et al., 2007;
Tariq et al., 2012; Sarcevic and Ferraro, 2017). However, to our
knowledge, it has not played a major role in safety science discourse per
se; instead, it has focused on understanding everyday work which re-
sonates well with Safety II. Distributed cognition could help account for
the dynamic events that create and compromise safety, i.e. how per-
formance variability emerges from the interactions of people, tools, and
artefacts in context.
Distributed Cognition for Teamwork (DiCoT) has been proposed as a
framework to facilitate distributed cognition analyses and was used to
shape our data gathering and preliminary analysis (Blandford and
Furniss, 2005; Furniss and Blandford 2006). This is composed of themes
and principles that help the analyst explore contextual interactions in
complex sociotechnical systems (Berndt et al., 2015). The themes are
listed below, and the associated principles are included as the supple-
mentary material to this paper:
• The information ﬂow theme focuses on how information is
transformed and moves around the system, often through task steps,
between people, artefacts and tools.
• The artefact theme focuses on what external tools and re-
presentations are used, and how their design impacts the compu-
tational properties of the system.
• The physical theme focuses on the physical arrangement of the
space, whether it is papers on a desk, people in a room or signs in a
building.
• The social theme focuses on the roles, responsibilities and expertise
of people in the system and how they do or do not work together.
• The evolutionary theme focuses on how the system has evolved
over time, to include both where it has been and where it might be
going, and how information is organised and distributed over time.
DiCoT has been extended to DiCoT-CL, which adds concentric layers
to the DiCoT themes (Furniss et al., 2015) (Fig. 1). This highlights so-
ciotechnical interactions close to and further away from the action
(from the ‘sharp end’ to the ‘blunt end’ (Catchpole and Wiegmann,
2012)). Using diﬀerent layers in sociotechnical system representations
is not novel (e.g. Rasmussen, 1997), and micro, meso and macro layers
commonly feature in discussing sociotechnical interactions (e.g.
Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010). Classically, the meso layer would be at
the organisational level and the macro layer at the national/societal
level; however, due to our focus on individuals and teams we deﬁne
them at a lower level of granularity:
• The micro layer includes sociotechnical interactions close to the
medical procedure or interactions with the device itself, e.g. inter-
acting with the pump interface and preparing infusions;
• The meso layer includes sociotechnical interactions at the ward
level, e.g. nurses might intervene to help when colleagues’ pumps
are alarming or they might not hand over information from a shift,
increasing the chance of omissions in patient care;
• Themacro layer includes sociotechnical interactions at the hospital
level and higher, e.g. hospital management setting the conﬁguration
of pumps and the design of the pumps by the manufacturer.
In a subsequent inductive analysis (informed by that ﬁrst analysis),
the interplay between structure, agency and performance deviations
emerged as being important for understanding safety. We brieﬂy out-
line some of the main sociological literature to give theoretical depth to
these concepts – a full review of the literature is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) posits that social structures
and individual agency are mutually dependent and co-evolve, each
constraining and enabling the other. The creation and reproduction of
social systems is dependent on both structure and agency. For example,
Giddens was interested in bridging between objective social theories
that perceived hard external social structures independent of the in-
dividual and subjective social theories that assumed social structures
are only housed in the perceptions and interpretations of individuals
(Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010). This resonates with anti-dualist theo-
rising in more recent safety science discourse that tries to encapsulate
ideas that bridge hard and soft sciences, material and social interac-
tions, decentralised and centralised control, and participant and ob-
server involvement in safety systems (Le Coze, 2013). One of the dis-
advantages levelled at a structuration theory is the idea of “central
conﬂation” (Archer 1982, 1988) that warns that if structure and agency
are entwined then it may be impossible to consider the detail and
contribution of each separately (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998), which
could also be a point of reﬂection for anti-dualist theorising in safety
science.
Agency is associated with free will and the ability of individuals to
decide their own course of action. In theorising about agency,
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) identify component elements of agency
and explain how these ‘agentic dimensions interpenetrate with forms of
structure’. They deﬁne human agency as “the temporally constructed
engagement by actors of diﬀerent structural environments - the tem-
poral-relational contexts of action - which, through the interplay of
habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms
those structures in interactive response to the problems posed by
changing historical situations. This deﬁnition encompasses what we
shall analytically distinguish below as the diﬀerent constitutive ele-
ments of human agency: iteration, projectivity, and practical evalua-
tion” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p.970). The iterative element em-
phasizes how actors react to past patterns of thought to help sustain
identities, interactions and institutions over time. The projective ele-
ment encompasses the imaginative faculties of actors in projecting
trajectories of possible future states that relate to their hopes, fears and
desires. The practical-evaluative element captures the practical and
normative judgements of actors and their response to ‘the emerging
demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations’
(Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p.971). As far as we are aware this depth
of sociological theory has not been directly applied to safety studies but
these issues of agency resonate with safety science themes such as rules,
necessary violations, and production and protection pressures (Le Coze,
2013; Hollnagel, 2009).
Structure is associated with a persistent pattern of social rules and/
or arrangements that could manifest themselves in situations as diverse
as a general election, a court case, joining the scouts, workplace pro-
cedures, religions, habits, routines and rituals. In theorising about
structures, Sewell (1992) says that there is a multiplicity of types and
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levels of structures that act concurrently on actors and might even be
contradictory, that resources are related to structures and may have
multiple meanings for actors, that there is unpredictability in what
structures to follow and invest in because eﬀects on resources are not
know, and that the internal structures of knowledge and schemas can be
creatively transferred to new situations. This provides a complex and
structured space for actors to operate in; this structure greatly inﬂu-
ences actors but it also gives them some degree of agency in terms of
how to navigate this space. Lopez and Scott (2000) highlight the roles
of three diﬀerent types of structure: institutional structure that provides
cultural and normative patterns of behaviour that deﬁne expectations
of agents, relational structure that emphasizes patterns of inter-
connections and interdependence between agents and the positions
they occupy, and embodied structure that refers to the habits and skills
possessed by agents. Structural themes are strong in the safety science
ﬁeld, and might be traced back to historical moves away from human
error as a cause of accidents to focus on latent conditions and socio-
technical system structures that contribute to poor performance (Le
Coze, 2013).
Structuration theory has advanced theorising about nursing re-
search and patient safety (Hardcastle et al., 2005; Groves et al., 2011;
Aveling et al., 2016). Researchers have also expanded the approach to
theorise about technology adoption and use by considering how tech-
nological structure enables and constrains individual agency, and how
individual agency and social structure shape technology use (DeSanctis
and Poole, 1994; Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010).
If we take the idea of co-evolution of structure and agency, central
to structuration theory, to be over generations then we get closer to the
original view of distributed cognition presented by Hutchins (1995a).
Hutchins uses Simon’s (1981) parable of the ant to emphasize the en-
vironment’s role in shaping cognition. Brieﬂy, we may attribute the
complicated movements of an ant on the beach to its knowledge,
learning and decision-making; especially as it seems to move less ran-
domly and ﬁnd sources of food more eﬃciently over time. However, the
ant’s trajectory tells us more about the beach than the ant. The argu-
ment is that it is the same simple ant but the pheromones laid on the
beach by the rest of the colony allow it to engage with the environment
more eﬃciently. Simon (1981) uses the parable to emphasize the role of
the external artiﬁcial environment on cognitive processes. Hutchins
(1995a) extends this message but emphasizes how cognition is struc-
tured, e.g. by the evolution of tools and artefacts, by preceding gen-
erations through a process of sociocultural heritage. Both of these em-
phasise environmental structure in cognitive activity.
Within haematology, infusion pumps play a vital role in treating
patients by delivering drugs and ﬂuids intravenously, and delivering
enteral and parenteral feed. We aimed to investigate how safety is
constructed and compromised around infusions on a haematology
ward, and to describe the sociotechnical system in which infusion
practice is organised and embedded. Diﬀerent clinical contexts have
diﬀerent infusion arrangements and issues; infusion safety in haema-
tology has not been focused on previously. This work also contributes to
situated accounts of how Safety II may be studied and how safety is
usually maintained around infusions more generally.
Fig.1. The DiCoT concentric layers (DiCoT-CL) framework (adapted from Furniss et al., 2015). Each layer of the sociotehcnical system is divided into ﬁve areas to
reﬂect the themes of the diﬀerent DiCoT models, i.e. information ﬂow, artefact, physical, social and evolutionary models.
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2. Methods
2.1. Study design
Ethnographic observations and interviews were used to investigate
infusion administration and the wider system in which it was em-
bedded. Ethnography was considered an important methodological
approach for exploring how frontline staﬀ worked, identifying tacit
knowledge, unremarkable routines and issues in-situ. Essentially this
allowed us to engage with how safety is constructed and compromised
in context, while paying attention to the local rationality of staﬀ, i.e.
how they understood things from their perspective. DiCoT-CL (Furniss
et al., 2015) guided the data collection and analysis. The study was
approved by an NHS Research Ethics Committee [10/H0715/13].
2.2. Setting
The haematology ward was in a busy London teaching hospital. It
had 19 beds in separate side rooms with en suite facilities so that each
patient could be kept in isolation. Each side room had positive or ne-
gative air pressure to keep airborne bacteria out if the patient was
immunocompromised, or in if they had an infectious disease. Infection
control procedures included barrier nursing, which meant nurses typi-
cally washed their hands; put on a disposable apron and gloves, and
sometimes a mask, before entering a side room; and washed their hands
and threw away the disposable protective clothing after leaving the side
room. Between each patient side room and the main ward corridor was
a small anteroom that had a sink, stocks of protective clothing and bins
so that barrier nursing could be performed.
During the daytime, nursing staﬀ typically comprised a nurse
manager, four nurses and two healthcare assistants. However, staﬃng
levels varied from shift to shift and sometimes included student nurses
and temporary staﬀ. Paper prescription charts were used, with standard
infusion pumps that did not include drug libraries or dose error re-
duction software.
2.3. Data collection
Observations focused on infusion administration, plus preparation
where possible. Infusions via pumps were observed, including in-
travenous and subcutaneous infusions and nasogastric feeds. Bolus
doses of medication were excluded. Staﬀ were asked for written consent
to observe their work at the start of a shift. Patients were not asked for
consent because their data was not the focus of the study, but they were
verbally asked for permission to observe their treatment. Data collec-
tion mechanisms included:
(1) Observations of infusion administrations, plus their preparation
where possible;
(2) nterviewing staﬀ (between infusions and other tasks);
(3) Observing the general ebb and ﬂow of ward life;
(4) Talking to patients informally as part of observing their care.
(5) Photos were taken of artefacts but not people or patient data.
The number of observed infusions was counted. The interviews with
staﬀ (which took place between infusions and other tasks) were not
counted. In practice these interviews were formed from partial con-
versations spread across and between shifts when nurses found the
time, and some nurses were much more engaged than others.
DiCoT-CL themes and principles informed the data collection
(Blandford and Furniss, 2005; Furniss and Blandford 2006). Other areas
of interest were also attended to if they were relevant to the context of
infusion administration, e.g., patient care and experience. The ﬁrst
author, who has expertise in ﬁeldwork and distributed cognition, col-
lected all data and kept extensive ﬁeld notes of the context, observa-
tions and interviews.Ta
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2.4. Analysis
Field notes were transcribed and coded by the ﬁrst author. The data
were explored through deductive and inductive coding, which were
done in parallel. NVivo 11 qualitative data analysis software was used
to aid this process.
Deductive coding used DiCoT-CL (Furniss et al., 2015). Observa-
tions were coded by theme (i.e. information ﬂow, artefact, physical,
social and evolutionary), by layer (i.e. micro, meso and macro layers),
and associated DiCoT-CL principles such as situation awareness, ar-
rangement of equipment, expert coupling, and horizon of observation
where relevant (see supplementary material). All co-authors checked
and reﬁned the categorisation and description of the resultant thirty-
seven distributed cognition features (see Tables 1–3).
Inductive coding included features of the context and activities that
described infusion practice and the context of work. New themes
emerged during the analysis and their relationships were captured in a
model of safety structuration. Narratives were developed to illustrate
the relationships: three major issues for managing infusion practices on
the ward were described, emphasizing how the new themes in the
model played out in practice. Narratives were chosen because these
issues traversed a number of themes and they could not readily be
captured in short descriptions. All co-authors checked and reﬁned the
narratives and their thematic classiﬁcations (see Tables 4–6).
3. Results
Observations were conducted on 11 days over a 9month period
(August 2012 – March 2013), totalling about 120 h of ﬁeldwork. The
researcher observed nurses administering 51 infusions.
3.1. A Distributed cognition view of the sociotechnical system
Thirty-seven distributed cognition features were identiﬁed in the
data; each one has a unique case number across Tables 1–3.
Infusion practice is part of a complex sociotechnical system that
involves diﬀerent tools and technologies, distributed over diﬀerent
people and physical space, over diﬀerent periods and patterns of time
(Tables 1–3). The speciﬁc conﬁguration of each element of the system
can aﬀect safety and performance. Fig. 2 relates to the social theme and
shows overlapping areas of responsibility and goals in staﬀ structure:
patients were typically allocated evenly among the nurses but higher
dependency patients could aﬀect the division of labour. Fig. 3 relates to
the physical theme and shows a schematic diagram of the ward. Beds
11, 12 and 13 had healthcare professionals passing by more frequently
because they were next to the treatment room and reception, so high
risk patients were generally positioned here so that they could be
monitored more easily.
Artefacts were brought into coordination to set up and administer
infusions, such as paper prescription charts, infusion pumps, additive
labels, and trays and trolleys to organise the work. Fig. 4 shows a se-
parate trolley for chemotherapy administration, which physically and
cognitively organised equipment for that task and helped to ensure
separation of equipment from that used for other types of medication.
Fig. 5 shows a nurse using a small ruler for measuring millimetres on a
syringe that was marked in millilitres. What could have been a com-
plicated calculation to convert millimetres into millilitres was trans-
formed into a simple perceptual task thanks to the ruler. However,
operating in millimetres per hour conﬂicted with national guidance,
which warned that many users did not ﬁnd this intuitive (Case No. 37 in
Table 3).
Diﬀerent layers of the sociotechnical system inﬂuence safety and
infusion devices. For example, the micro layer generally refers to a
single nurse with the patient at the bedside focused directly on the
infusion task (e.g., speciﬁc details in the prescription chart were
sometimes incomplete or incorrect (Case No. 29 in Table 3); the mesoTa
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layer generally refers to interactions at the ward level (e.g. between two
diﬀerent professionals) or other activities that are beyond the infusion
task itself (e.g., two patients might be confused on the ward and there
might be severe staﬀ shortages (Case Nos. 32 & 34 in Table 3); and the
macro layer refers to interactions at the hospital level or higher (e.g.,
problems with the manufacture of giving sets and national guidance to
follow (Case Nos. 36 & 37 in Table 3). The boundaries between layers
were not always found to be clear.
At the micro level, nurses experienced repeated patterns of the same
drugs, doses, infusion rates and volumes for patients with certain con-
ditions. Common infusion administration appeared to become less
about unfamiliar number entry and more about meaningful schemas.
This indicates a degree of expert coupling between experienced nurses
and infusion administration orders. Nurses reported that they have
done some calculations so many times that they remember the ﬁgures
they need by rote: “Some people have to do the calculation but for us
who have been doing it for so long we just know the numbers“. In one
case the nurses embedded rate information in their name for an infu-
sion, i.e. ‘phosphate 43’ was used to refer to a 500ml phosphate infu-
sion prescribed over 12 h, which requires an infusion rate of about
43ml/hr. This suggests that these patterns can be reiﬁed in language.
3.2. A view of the system in terms of structure, agency and performance
variability
Three new themes emerged from the inductive analysis that are
important for understanding infusion practice: structure, agency and
performance variability. The structural elements of the sociotechnical
system provide it with shape, constraints, expectations and plans. These
are realised in the design and conﬁguration of technologies such as
infusion pumps, the design of artefacts such as prescription charts, and
the organisation of equipment, people and processes (Table 1). The
agency theme captures people’s resourcefulness, inventiveness and
volition. This is observed in adaptations and workarounds (Table 2).
People do not always operate mechanistically as they need to cope with
surprises, system degradations and opportunities to improve perfor-
mance. The performance variability theme captures positive and ne-
gative deviations from norms established at the individual, ward, hos-
pital or national level. These are observed in incidents, near misses and
discrepancies such as incorrect and missing information (Table 3).
Structure and agency are co-dependent while performance varia-
bility emerges from their interaction; however, the developing situation
is monitored, and anticipated potential outcomes can feed back into the
emerging situation (Fig. 6). This adaptive control could lead to at-
tempted structural changes or inﬂuence how agents choose to act. Po-
sitive and negative deviations are highlighted in Fig. 6 as instances of
Table 4
Narrative 1 – Downstream consequences of the infusion pump’s 10min pre-completion alarm, and commentary on the interplay between structure, agency and
performance variability This narrative has been formed by synthesizing ﬁeld notes from the ﬁrst author’s ﬁrst person perspective.
Narrative 1 – Downstream consequences of the infusion pump’s 10min pre-completion alarm Commentary on the interplay between structure, agency and performance
variability
The infusion pump’s 10min pre-completion alarm was a source of frustration for staﬀ and patients.
One of the patients described the issue: “The nurse sets up the pump and leaves, 10min before
it ends it goes oﬀ which could be at any time e.g. 2 am, the patient then calls the nurse, they
come and ask why you called them, then they turn oﬀ the alarm and leave. Then the pump
really alarms as it is ﬁnishing, the patient tings the bell again and then the nurse comes once
they're free. […] When you have been lying here for three weeks you notice things you might
not normally… pointless alarms… you need to rethink what the alarm is for, for who, for when
and for what action. Is it to alarm me as the patient?” The nurse supported this account and
said the alarm disturbs the patients, wastes staﬀ time and seems needless. She also referred to
some patients who refused treatment via pumps “because the noises it made drove them mad”.
The process of barrier nursing (which is supported by the physical structure
of the ward) conﬂicts with interactive structure of the device.
The patient suggested that nurses carry some form of technology that could receive alerts from
pumps remotely, so they could be notiﬁed directly rather than disturbing patients.
Suggested change in structure to address issue.
Later I found out that the infusion pump had a standard conﬁguration across the hospital (apart
from in critical care and paediatrics). This meant that 10min before an infusion was due to
ﬁnish a pre-completion alarm would sound. This was intended to alert the nurse to prepare for
a follow on infusion or prepare to disconnect the device. However, due to the physical layout
of the haematology ward this pre-alarm frustrated staﬀ and patients. A nurse said that they
raised the issue about the pre-completion alarms with management a long time ago but they
were told that this was how the pumps were designed and nothing could be done about it.
However, this was not a design issue for the manufacturer but a conﬁgurable option set by the
hospital. There was clear friction between the practice of barrier nursing and the interactive
structure of the device’s pre-alarm conﬁguration.
Conﬁguration of the device is done at the macro level. However, ward staﬀ
did not know who was responsible for this.
A downstream consequence of this issue is that nurses would sometimes break with protocol and
tell the patients how to silence the pre-completion alarm directly or indirectly. An ‘indirect’
example was a nurse explaining how to silence the pre-completion alarm to me; however, she
seemed more concerned that the patient indirectly understood what she was saying as the
pump was facing them as she went through the process step by step. The patient made it clear
that they were not ‘brave enough’ to interact with the device themselves. A ‘direct’ example
was a patient who said, “If that goes oﬀ I just press the OK button; she [the nurse] has taught
me well.” The nurse was a little embarrassed as it was not something she should have done.
The nurse said, “You know some patients you can tell but others you can't.” Other nurses that
did this also said that they do not allow all patients to do this. Indeed, one patient who was
prone to confusion had worked out what to do by himself, but was reprimanded for interacting
with his pump, and the nurse tried to warn him that he could potentially give himself a bolus
dose and cause himself an injury. I later heard that on occasion patients had been found in side
rooms with unﬁnished infusions and pumps with ﬂat batteries, and it may have been because
patients had silenced their pump’s alarm when it was warning of a low battery rather than a
pre-completion alarm. This example shows adaptations by staﬀ and patients, and the potential
deviations that can follow.
Staﬀ and patients adapted to the problems they faced in coping with this
structure, which sometimes led to deviations.
A diﬀerent patient told me how she didn’t like to be a nuisance and so she would sit there for
10min whilst the pre-completion alarm went oﬀ next to her. She would only call the nurse
when it was time to turn oﬀ the pump.
Again, patients would adapt to the structure they perceived. This could also
be considered in a deviation in patient experience.
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performance variability that tend towards satisfactory and un-
satisfactory outcomes. These could be extreme as in the case of an ac-
cident or an example of excellence, or ordinarily they may be more
mundane. From a Safety II perspective there is always some perfor-
mance variability to be attended to as diﬀerent trade-oﬀs and com-
plexities are negotiated to maintain safety.
Three narratives developed from the data illustrate how these
themes play out in practice (see Tables 4–6). In Narrative 1 (Table 4),
the physical structure of the ward appeared to conﬂict with the inter-
active conﬁguration of the infusion pumps. The pumps were conﬁgured
to alarm ten minutes before the end of an infusion, which meant pa-
tients had to summon a nurse to silence the alarm, only for the nurse to
Table 5
Narrative 2 – Issues with national guidance for nasogastric tube placement for infusions of artiﬁcial nutrition, and commentary on the interplay between structure,
agency and performance variability This narrative has been formed by synthesizing ﬁeld notes from the ﬁrst author’s ﬁrst person perspective.
Narrative 2 – Issues with national guidance for nasogastric tube placement for infusions
of artiﬁcial nutrition
Commentary on the interplay between structure, agency and performance variability
The husband of a patient was concerned that the continuing delay to his wife’s
nasogastric feed was contributing to her poor health. National policy had recently
changed in response to an incident where feed was accidentally pumped into a
patient’s lungs, which caused them to drown. Now, at the trust, an X-ray needed to be
taken to check the position of the tube before the feed could be started. The husband
complained that the policy had changed but the practices to manage this policy had
not. The patient had her nasogastric tube in place since 4am, she still needed an X-ray
to conﬁrm its placement, but it was getting close to 5 pm now and that is when the
radiologists go home, so she would have to wait another day before getting any feed.
New structural guidance had ﬁltered down from the national level, to the trust and to
the ward. This was in response to serious deviations. These structural changes were
contributing to other deviations as patient’s feed was delayed.
When the pump was eventually started the husband came to fetch me. He was aware that
I was interested in infusion practices and pumps. He wanted to know whether the
pump was working or not. When I looked at it there were no moving parts and it did
not appear to be doing anything. We fetched the nurse who was also unsure. She
disconnected the line and reconnected it. The pump whirred and moved and pushed
a shot of feed down the line. There was a light bulb moment as we realised that the
pump was not continuous but the patient would get a shot of feed every so often.
There was not enough feedback from the pump to let us know it was working and we
had the wrong mental model of how we thought it should work.
The design of the device did not provide suitable feedback to indicate whether it was
working or not, which relates to its structure. Consequently we were not sure if a
deviation had occurred.
Later I observed another issue relating to veriﬁcation of nasogastric tube placement: a
doctor asked where their patient was as they were met with an empty room on the
ward. The nurse informed him that the patient had gone down to X-ray. This was not
good news. The doctor had anticipated delays in getting an X-ray for the nasogastric
placement so he had booked the patient in early, but now the patient had gone down
to have an X-ray before the nasogastric tube had been put in place. So the X-ray was
pointless, the patient was exposed to an unnecessary radiation dose, and the whole
procedure further delayed. An example of the doctor adapting to the structure they
are met with, but ultimately this time it being a failed adaptation.
Staﬀ adapted to the problems they faced in coping with this structure, which
sometimes led to deviations.
Table 6
Narrative 3 – Issues with caring for patients receiving infusions away from the ward, and commentary on the interplay between structure, agency and performance
variability This narrative has been formed by synthesizing ﬁeld notes from the ﬁrst author’s ﬁrst person perspective.
Narrative 3 – Issues with caring for patients receiving infusions away from the ward Commentary on the interplay between structure, agency and performance variability
Ambulatory patients were being treated oﬀ-site. Here patients would receive infusions
through a special pump that could be locked with a pin code. The pump would be
programmed on the ward and then the patient would go home or to a nearby hotel
while the infusion ﬁnished. The ward manager explained that this was cheaper than
the patients occupying a hospital bed and probably more comfortable for them too. A
‘spare’ bed was kept on the haematology ward just in case an ambulatory patient
needed to come back into the ward for extra care. However, this ‘spare’ bed had a
special status that could not be recorded on the hospital’s bed management system,
consequently they would get many calls about their ‘free’ bed as people tried to ﬁnd
beds for patients in the hospital.
The ward was reconﬁguring and expanding its capacity by treating inpatients away
from the physical conﬁnes of the ward. This was an adaptation leading to new
structure. However, some structures like the design of the hospital’s bed management
system could not be changed, which caused issues.
Managing hospital beds is a complex task involving diﬀerent risks and uncertainties. For
example, one patient had gone down to surgery and given she would go to a post-op
ward after the manager re-assigned her bed when she left as he needed it for another
patient. To their surprise the patient came back from surgery – it was not going ahead
today for some reason. The returning patient was given the ‘spare’ bed because there
was no other room on the ward.At the same time an ambulatory patient had come in
for extra care and needed a bed, but there was now no ‘spare’ bed. The ambulatory
patient waited in the waiting area but hour after hour went by. The ward manager
was in a predicament because there was no room on the ward. The evening was
drawing in and the patient still did not have a bed after seven hours of waiting.
Another patient was deteriorating and was receiving special care from a member of
critical care on the ward. The manager asked if he could be transferred to critical
care. This would free up a space for the ambulatory patient. However, critical care
was full and had higher priority cases.
The ward manager has to use the resources and structure of the ward as best they can,
which sometimes means adapting to surprises and deviations. Here the structure,
‘spare bed,’ had been forsaken for another priority need, i.e. the patient returning
from theatre. This led to a deviation in that an ambulatory patient needed to be
admitted but there was no space. The ward manager tried to use critical care as a
solution to their capacity issues but that did not work.
On a diﬀerent day an ambulatory patient phoned in because their pump was beeping and
the nurse had to try to problem solve and give them instructions over the phone. This
new way of working brought with it new problems as nurses on the ward were not
used to giving remote support over the phone.
The operating structure of the ward meant that staﬀ needed to adapt to new ways of
working and providing support.
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have to come back ten minutes later. Downstream consequences of this
included frustration for the nurse and patient, wasted nursing time,
patients lying next to pumps with alarms sounding for 10min because
they did not want to add to the nurse’s workload, and patients directly
interacting with their pumps against hospital rules. It was suggested by
one nurse that this learned patient behaviour could have contributed to
cases of pumps running out of battery power and stopping early, i.e.
patients may have silenced their pump’s alarm when it was warning of a
low battery rather than a pre-completion alarm. Adapting to these
frustrations, some nurses coached patients to silence these alarms
themselves, which was also against hospital rules. Further, this suggests
a failure of adaptive control: ward staﬀ believed this to be a device
design issue that could not be changed, but the device’s instruction
manual suggested that this was a conﬁguration that could be changed
Fig. 2. Staﬀ structure with overlapping areas of responsibility and goals. The
ward manager has overall responsibility and shares day to day running of ward
with one of the four nurses, who is designated the nurse in charge for the day.
These four nurses may be regular qualiﬁed nurses on the ward. Other variants
include students, and temporary staﬀ from a diﬀerent ward (i.e. bank staﬀ) or
from outside of the hospital (i.e. agency staﬀ). The two health care assistants
(HCA) assist the nurses in their duties, e.g. take blood glucose meter readings.
Fig. 3. Physical layout of the haematology
ward. Beds are labelled 1–19. A=multiple
rooms comprising oﬃce area, toilets, kitchen,
staﬀ areas, etc; B= empty reception area and
waiting area; C= treatment room where drugs
are prepared; D= active reception area with
receptionist; and E=ward manager’s oﬃce.
Arrows indicate entrances and exits to ward.
Fig. 4. Photo of chemotherapy trolley; each drawer has equipment needed for
this task.
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locally. One patient suggested changing the structure of the system to
resolve these issues, such that the nurse would carry a device to alert
them of the pump alarms directly rather than alerting the patient who
then needed to summon the nurse.
In Narrative 2 (Table 5), hospital systems struggled to eﬀectively
accommodate new national guidance, which added new structural de-
mands to nasogastric tube placements: positioning had to be conﬁrmed
by X-ray before the infusion was started. One patient suﬀered continued
delays to her X-ray which left her without nutrition overnight, which
caused distress to both her and her husband. To avoid such issues, in-
dividuals adopted workarounds, e.g. doctors booked X-rays before the
nasogastric tube had been placed in anticipation of delays. However,
this could lead to deviations, e.g. one patient had an X-ray before their
nasogastric tube was in place, so the X-ray had to be redone, adding to
the patient’s radiation burden and increasing workload for the radi-
ology department.
In Narrative 3 (Table 6), the ward had expanded its services to care
for inpatients with infusion pumps away from the hospital. For ex-
ample, some patients could now receive infusion treatment in a nearby
hotel. This innovation was driven by the ward’s space constraints and
reduced treatment costs, i.e. the nightly cost of a hotel room is a lot
cheaper than a hospital bed. A ‘spare’ bed was reserved for these am-
bulatory patients in case someone was unwell and needed to come back
on to the ward. However, the structure of the hospital bed management
system could not be adapted to eﬀectively show the status of the ‘spare’
bed for ambulatory patients. This meant the ward was under pressure to
ﬁll the bed reserved for ambulatory patients from other areas of the
hospital who saw it as ‘available’ on the system. These wider changes
also meant that nurses had to provide remote support to patients over
the phone, e.g. for infusion pump alarms. Again, this shows the chan-
ging structures with new deviations and need for adaptations left in its
wake. Fig. 6 captures these relationships.
4. Discussion
Our ﬁndings highlight how safety in infusion practices depends on
the unfolding interactions of a complex sociotechnical system. Factors
across the system, both close to and far from infusion practice, and
involving the interplay between structure, agency and performance
variability within the system, can all aﬀect safety.
Fig. 5. Photo of nurse using a ruler to measure millimetres on a syringe that is
marked in millilitres. This was for a syringe driver that was conﬁgured to de-
liver in millimetres over an hour.
Fig. 6. A sociotechnical structuration model
for studying safety, showing the interplay
between structure, agency and performance
variability. There are three main parts to
reading this model: (1) the relationship be-
tween structure and agency is capture by the
central vertical arrows; (2) performance
variability emerges from the interaction
between structure and agency and is dis-
tributed across the grey area horizontally;
(3) structure and agency can inﬂuence po-
sitive and negative outcomes while devia-
tions from the norm, and their anticipation,
can feed back to inﬂuence structure and
agency denoted by the dashed arrows.
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4.1. Infusion safety across sociotechnical themes and layers
Infusion practice is aﬀected by sociotechnical system design, which
validates previous ﬁndings (Carayon et al., 2005; Rajkomar and
Blandford, 2012). Also, Lyons and Blandford (2018) highlight the
challenges of troubleshooting infusion pumps at a distance, which
corroborates observations about nurses trying to provide remote sup-
port to patients over the phone. The deductive coding highlighted how
information is transformed and propagated across system structures
involving diﬀerent technologies, artefacts, people and processes, orga-
nised over diﬀerent spaces and patterns of time. However, micro, meso
and macro layers of distributed cognition have not previously been
considered for infusion practice. This has only been previously applied
to interactions around an inpatient blood glucose meter (Furniss et al.,
2015). The present paper provides evidence of their relevance for in-
fusion practice, as interactions at all levels can aﬀect safety: from new
national protocols to infusion device interfaces. This resonates with
previous safety models that examine diﬀerent layers close to and far
from the action (e.g. Rasmussen, 1997), sometimes conveyed as active
errors and latent conditions (e.g. Reason, 1990), or ‘sharp end’ and
‘blunt end’ factors (e.g. Cook and Woods, 1994; Catchpole and
Wiegmann, 2012).
4.2. Sociotechnical structuration model for safety
The structure, agency and performance variability framework that
has emerged from this empirical work is novel. The role of agency is
often neglected in distributed cognition literature and sociotechnical
systems research, which tends to focus on system structures rather than
the agency of individuals within it (Rochlin, 1999). Even though cog-
nition can be recognised as a largely individual activity, the unit of
analysis has been larger sociotechnical structures, e.g. a bridge of a ship
(Hutchins, 1995a), a cockpit (Hutchins, 1995b) or a control room
(Furniss and Blandford, 2006). To return to the parable described in the
introductory section, distributed cognition studies tend to focus on the
beach rather than the ant. Indeed, there is little or no account of agency
in infusion administration for critical care in the account developed by
Rajkomar and Blandford (2012); this is something new the current
study has highlighted. However, strategies patients adopt to cope with
the complexities of home haemodialysis were identiﬁed in a distributed
cognition study by Rajkomar et al. (2014). Hutchins (1995a, p.288)
made it clear that the adaptive capacity of humans plays a critical role
in producing and exploiting a rich world of cultural structure. Fig. 6
emphasises the idea of human agency and adaptive capacity for dis-
tributed cognition analyses, which would typically focus on system
structures.
Our results suggest that structural sources go beyond social and
technological structures to include other sociotechnical structures like
paper artefacts, information ﬂows and the arrangement of the physical
space. We use four elements from strong structuration theory (SST)
(Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010) to frame important insights from our
results: (i) external structures (context shaping factors), (ii) internal
structures (the psychology of individuals), (iii) agency (how agents
choose to act), and (iv) outcomes (where internal and external struc-
tures are reproduced or changed).
4.2.1. External structures
One of the most striking ﬁndings was the friction caused between
two external structures: the infusion pump’s pre-completion alarm and
the barrier nursing that was supported by the physical structure of the
ward. This had downstream consequences for social structures, in-
dividual agency and deviations, e.g. how nurses and patients interacted
together, whether nurses chose to follow hospital rules and issues cre-
ated by patients silencing alarms. In other areas of the hospital with
diﬀerent structures, e.g. where barrier nursing is not performed and
they have a more open physical space, the pre-alarm may help with
managing work.
4.2.2. Internal structures
At the ‘sharp end’, experienced nurses develop cognitive schemas
that organise patterns of thought around conditions, drugs, doses, vo-
lumes, and rates. For one infusion the nurses had even adapted their
language to oﬄoad cognitive eﬀort into the environment (Table1: Case
No.2). The ideas of cognitive schemas and using language in this way
are absent from previous accounts of health numeracy that have used
distributed cognition (Ancker and Kaufman, 2007). Experienced nurses
are likely to have an intuition about whether or not numerical values
and other infusion details ﬁt their cognitive schemas (Klein, 1999). The
idea of cognitive schemas in this context could aﬀect how researchers
understand interactions with infusion pumps. For example, Back et al.
(2012) asked participants without clinical knowledge to programme
volumes and rates into simulated infusion pumps in a lab. They found
that when information was close to hand, participants were more likely
to programme values into two pumps at the same time (e.g., pro-
gramming rates on pump A and pump B, then volumes on pump A and
pump B, and then starting pumps A and B). Here, they showed that by
manipulating the external structure, i.e. the distance of the prescription
chart, they aﬀected interleaving within programming cycles, which
increased the chance of omitting to release the roller clamp. They re-
mark that it is therefore not necessarily better to have task relevant
information close to hand in safety critical contexts. However, the
current study suggests that for real infusion administration contexts,
cognitive schemas (i.e. internal structures) reduce the likelihood of
interleaving within programming cycles because they are programming
based on their schema rather than on individual numbers with little or
no meaning. The drug, volume, rate and duration form a coherent
whole for experts, just as this sentence is more than individual words.
We observed only one case in which two infusion pumps were set up at
the same time; there, the two pumps were programmed separately and
then started at the same time. This corroborates observations that
nurses can interleave between programming cycles (Furniss et al.,
2011a; Gant, 2011), but we have found no evidence of interleaving
within programming cycles as the experiment suggests. Internal struc-
tures play an important role in safety.
4.2.3. Active agency
How agents choose to act can be inﬂuenced by the spirit of the
structures that shape the system (i.e., how the system ought to behave
like the spirit of the law); where there is an incoherent spirit there will
be a weaker exertion on behaviour (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). This
might be observed where staﬀ resources do not match the demands of
the task, and staﬀ have to make trade-oﬀ decisions between being ef-
ﬁcient and thorough (Hollnagel, 2009). Staﬃng issues were observed in
our results that could have led to such trade-oﬀs (Table 3: Case Nos. 34
and 35). Incoherence might also surface where structures do not suit
each other (Table 4: Narrative 1) and where there are innovations in the
system (Tables 5 and 6: Narratives 2 and 3).
4.2.4. Outcomes
Changes in internal and external structures seem most obvious in
the face of system innovations (e.g. national guidance and accom-
modating patients oﬀ-site), which lead to adaptations and deviations as
the system tries to reorganise itself to cope with these new demands.
Multiple dependencies and feedback loops aﬀect emergent performance
as agents adapt their behaviour to new structures and learn about new
issues (e.g. Table 5: Narrative 2). Outcomes depend on the dynamic and
unfolding interactions between structure, agency, and performance
variability.
Greenhalgh and Stones (2010) suggest a triadic relationship be-
tween social structure, agency and technology. However, the model we
propose groups sociotechnical structures together and introduces per-
formance variability as the third element in the framework.
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Performance deviations from the norm are critical for safety, which is
why they are salient in our study. We suggest that the potential for
performance deviations co-evolves with structure and agency through
feedback mechanisms, e.g. monitoring current performance and an-
ticipating future performance.
4.3. From distributed cognition to structuration theory
Revealing the complexities of the sociotechnical system that inﬂu-
ence the safety of infusion administration has demonstrated distributed
cognition’s utility. Following Halverson’s (2002) four categories for
assessing the utility of theory: it has provided descriptive power (i.e. a
conceptual structure to make sense of and describe the activity);
rhetorical power (by helping us name and highlight important features of
the cognitive system); inferential power (e.g. we have inferred that
nurses have cognitive schemas for infusion administration rather than
observing this phenomenon directly); and application power (e.g.
changing the conﬁguration of the pre-completion alarm on the infusion
pump would beneﬁt staﬀ and patients in this context). However, the
deductive application of DiCoT-CL (Furniss et al., 2015) was limited in
light of the emergent inductive themes. Distributed cognition mainly
focused on sociotechnical structures that could be internally or ex-
ternally represented in the cognitive system. Applications of distributed
cognition typically say little about notions of agency. This encouraged
us to go beyond current analytical support for distributed cognition to
create a new model and to draw on structuration theory as a ‘lens’ to
add theoretical insight.
Distributed cognition helps develop the notion of structural sources.
Coming from sociology, structures have been predominantly social, as
applied in safety contexts (e.g., Aveling et al., 2016; Groves et al.,
2011). Technical structures have been important for safety science (e.g.
Perrow, 1984) and included in studies by researchers looking at tech-
nology use (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994; Greenhalgh and Stones, 2010).
Following sociotechnical traditions, our analysis suggests that system
safety is not only dependent on broad social and technical structures,
but also other situated DiCoT-CL related structures, e.g. in the form of
technology-in-use, information ﬂows, artefacts and physical spaces.
Structuration theory helps emphasise and develop the notion of
agency and how it is coupled to structural sources for sociotechnical
system research. This can be at the level of individual adaptations and
workarounds as we have focused on here. However, we have not ex-
plored wider aspects of agency such as beliefs, rituals and non-func-
tional displays, which are championed by authors like Rochlin (1999).
For example, a broader analysis might lead to a deeper account of why
the patient in Narrative 1 decided to sit next to an alarming infusion
pump for ten minutes rather than call the nurse to turn it oﬀ, and the
role of visitors in safety, such as the concerned husband in Narrative 2.
Exploring wider aspects of agency is part of future work.
4.4. Strengths and limitations
The generalizability of our ﬁndings needs to be investigated as in-
sights about infusion practices in this context cannot simply be trans-
ferred to contexts with a diﬀerent conﬁguration because complex
adaptive systems cannot easily be decomposed into component parts
(Sittig and Singh, 2010). For example, ICU typically has one nurse per
patient, stacks of pumps per patient, and infusion administration re-
cording practices that would be unfamiliar in haematology (Rajkomar
and Blandford, 2012). However, a strength of this study is that it has
explored the interactions important in this haematology context.
One person, the ﬁrst author, performed the data gathering and
analysis; however, the resulting distributed cognition features were
checked and reﬁned by the co-authors. Extra checks on the deductive
coding (as we have done) are appropriate, whereas it is inappropriate to
do similar validation steps on the inductive coding because of its more
complex and emergent nature (Blandford et al., 2016) so we rely here
on the account of the analysis process and the inspectability and
credibility of the inferences.
The safety structuration model has emerged from this analysis at the
same time as helping us to make sense of the data. Therefore it needs to
be tested in future studies where it can be used from the start. Further
theorising between the elements in the model are needed. For example,
some structures are easier to change than others, which can aﬀect
adaptive actions; e.g., coaching patients to silence their own pre-alarms
was within the nurses’ scope of control whereas reconﬁguring the de-
sign of the infusion pumps was not. This is for future work.
5. Conclusion
This study has revealed interactions inﬂuencing safety around in-
fusion devices in hospitals that have not been previously documented.
These insights include intricacies close to the infusion administration
such as how the cognitive schemas of staﬀ develop around conditions,
doses, volumes and rates of infusions, and the manner in which some of
this information is encoded in language. Inﬂuences away from the in-
fusion administration include, for example, national guidance about
nasogastric tube placement, the design of hospital bed management
systems, staﬃng levels and conﬁguration of device alarms. Distributed
cognition lent itself to exploring these complex situated interactions
across multiple themes and diﬀerent layers. Three new themes also
emerged showing the role of structure, agency and performance
variability in safety. We propose a sociotechnical structuration model
for safety whereby safety is constructed through the co-evolution of
structural sources (e.g. procedures, technologies, artefacts, social
structure and space); the agency of people who appropriate, work
around and adapt structures in the face of contextual demands; and
performance variability in processes and outcomes (e.g. incidents, near
misses and opportunities).
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